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This book is a collection of twelve essays written by the author over a period of
thirteen years, from 1988 to 2001. As the title suggests, the bulk of the essays, seven
to be exact, investigate the pre-Qin understanding of piety (xiao 孝) and brotherhood
(you 友). In particular the author argues against the common understanding that, from
the early Zhou dynasty, “xiao” referred to filial piety to blood parents, and “you” as a
concept was relatively independent of other relationship concepts like “xiao” in the
same period. Instead the author suggests that “xiao” as filial piety and “you” as
friendship are the results of Confucius’s innovation and its later elaboration by other
early Confucians like Mencius and Xunzi. There are in addition two essays on early
Confucianism, one a re-interpretation of the contentious term “keji 克己” (overcoming
oneself or the self being capable) in the Analects, and the other a comparative study of
Xunzi and Hegel’s understanding of human nature. The book then follows with one
essay on Han Confucianism, which studies the contribution of LIU Xiang 劉向, and
another on Song Confucianism, which discusses the incorporation of Chan Buddhism
by Neo-Confucianism. The book concludes with an essay on Hegel’s concept of
badness.
The author indicates in the introduction that although there have been continuous
calls for the revival of Confucianism, in reality the efforts in doing so have been
seriously hampered by the negative preconceptions of Confucianism among the
general public. In his opinion such negative preconceptions can only be removed
by a serious and meticulous study of Confucian canons and the development of
Confucian tradition in history. The author particularly calls for a restoration of the
“historical consciousness” of Chinese culture. I believe that it is with such a back-
ground understanding that the author writes the essays of the book.
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The seven essays on piety and brotherhood demonstrate especially well the close
attention paid to the original texts and an awareness of the historical development of
cultural ideas. The first two essays of the book both investigate the understanding of
piety in the Western Zhou dynasty. With occasional repetition, the two essays argue
from different perspectives against the idea that “xiao” in the Western Zhou meant
filial piety and was a virtue for the relationship between parents and sons. Drawing on
evidence from inscribed texts on bronze vessels and various original texts such as the
Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚書), the Book of Odes (Shijing 詩經), the Erya 爾雅,
the Chronicle of Zuo (Chunqiu Zuo Zhuan 春秋左傳), the Book of Rites (Liji 禮記), the
Analects, the Mencius, and the Classic of Filial Piety (Xiaojing 孝經), the two essays
argue convincingly that “xiao” in the Western Zhou referred to piety to deceased
ancestors and was a virtue especially for kings and lords. It was not until the Spring
and Autumn period that “xiao” became applicable to living fathers, as the author
suggests in the third essay. However, in this period the living fathers to whom piety
was practised were almost always the reigning lords. The author points out that piety
in the Spring and Autumn period continued to be a political rather than a moral
concept and was mainly used to maintain political stability. The innovation came with
Confucius. The author suggests in the fourth essay that it was Confucius who first
vigorously promoted piety as a personal virtue, which consisted in everyone paying
respect to his or her living or deceased parents. The major objective of piety was no
longer political stability but moral cultivation, in particular the heart/mind’s feeling at
ease (xinan 心安). The author further proclaims that Confucius’s new conception of
piety shattered the Western Zhou’s patriarchal feudalism and helped the establishment
of independent families and consequently territorial states. The author heavily relies
on Lewis Henry Morgan’s analysis of social evolution and the distinction between the
kinship society and the territorial state in Ancient Society. It is certainly debatable
whether and to what extent Morgan’s analysis applies to ancient China. Nonetheless
the author should be applauded for applying the analysis of social evolution to the
understanding of Confucianism, thereby extending the grounds for critical reflection.
Less laudable is the author’s curious claim that Confucius’s advocacy of filial piety
aims not at the promotion of human relationships and morality but at the indepen-
dence of families from clanship (97). It is plausible that Confucius’s recommendation
of filial piety and other personal virtues did help shake up the patriarchal feudalism of
the Western Zhou. However, it is less convincing that Confucius consciously aimed
to overthrow the Western Zhou’s clanship system, since he explicitly expressed his
admiration of the Zhou’s ritual culture in the Analects (3.14). The author should at
least provide more textual evidence for such a controversial claim. On the other hand,
while the author does acknowledge the innovative and humanitarian spirit of Con-
fucius’s understanding of filial piety (84), he does not elaborate further. Instead he
makes the above-mentioned claim that Confucius does not take human relationships
and morality as his utmost pursuit. In a similar vein, the author makes the interesting
point that the concept of “piety” is receptive to creative reinterpretations and conse-
quently is capable of renovation with time (61) but follows with no further articula-
tion. It is regrettable that such an important aspect of “piety” does not receive further
examination. If such neglect is understandable given the author’s self-avowed aim in
historical explanation, the less-than-accurate portrayal of Confucian conception of
filial piety should receive harsher criticism. The author suggests at various places that
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according to the Confucian conception of filial piety parents enjoy a supreme
position, and sons must not object even when parents act immorally (20, 74, 81).
Confucianism does propose that sons must not openly confront parents, yet such a
recommendation is to preserve love between parents and sons, not to acquiesce in
immorality. In the Xunzi it is said that real filial piety amounts to following righ-
teousness and not the father, and if parents’ orders are morally wrong then sons must
not obey such orders (Book 29). Similarly the Classic of Filial Piety explicitly states
that Filial piety never amounts to simple obedience and records that if the father acts
against righteousness, the son must remonstrate with him. It is unfortunate that the
author gives a careless portrayal of the Confucian conception of filial piety, for this
unavoidably jeopardizes his efforts to remove the conservative image of Confucianism.
The two essays on “brotherhood” trace the three-stage development of the concept
in early China. The author points out that while in the Western Zhou “piety” governed
the relationship with deceased ancestors, “brotherhood” in the same period was
applied to human relationships in the living world (129). Thus “brotherhood” gov-
erned not only the relationship between elder and younger brother, but also the
relationship between lord and subject, as well as that of living father and living
son. This was the case because of the kinship politics of the Western Zhou, and just
like “piety,” “brotherhood” in the period was used to maintain political stability.
Beginning with Confucius, “brotherhood” was freed from kinship politics and ap-
plied to the fellowship of the scholar-officials (shi 士). Confucianism of the time also
advocated that the ideal relationship of lord and subject should be modelled on
“brotherhood” and be equal friendship, suggests the author. Only in the late Warring
States period did the legalist HAN Feizhi criticize the application of “brotherhood” to
the relationship between lord and subject and consequently the concept was severed
from politics. The author has served Confucianism well by exposing the rich contents
of the Confucian understanding of “brotherhood.” In particular the author is right to
highlight the spirit of equality and the emphasis of personal integrity of the concept
(138). It is conceivable that with further articulation the Confucian conception of
“brotherhood” has potential to be the foundation of civil society for modern China.
The last essay of the group gives an account of the Mohist conception of “piety.” The
author points out that Mohism de-emphasizes the link of filial piety to one’s own
parents and, as a consequence, attempts to shaken the independence of family and the
individuality of people. In such a way Mohism acted against the intellectual current of
the times. This essay complements well the major argument of the author that early
Confucianism was a progressive and evolutionary force.
The essay on LIU Xiang illustrates Liu’s contribution in extending the intellectual
territory of Confucianism. The author suggests the Liu pioneers in advocating two
ideas. First, Confucius lays the foundation for all other schools. Second, all other
schools represent the further development of the Confucian Classics. These two ideas
of Liu blur the distinction between Confucianism and other schools and provide the
justification for enriching Confucianism with ideas from other schools. The author
further points out that indeed Liu attempts to combine Confucianism with the thought
of other schools in his later works. In these later works Liu also exhibits the flexibility
of Confucianism as well as its ability in accommodating different circumstances.
Although the explicit target of the essay is Liu’s contribution to Confucianism, in my
opinion the author’s real intention is in hinting at the contemporary mission of
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Confucianism, which is to change with circumstances and incorporate ideas from
other sources. The essay on Song Confucianism serves a similar function. The author
argues that Song Confucians incorporate quite a few Chan Buddhist ideas into their
articulation of Mencius’s thought on heart/mind and human nature. In particular,
Song Confucians borrow the metaphysics of Chan Buddhism to supply an ontolog-
ical foundation for Confucian morality. In the essay the author has been careless in
attributing to Mencius some terms which actually do not appear in the Mencius.
Examples are “xing ji shan 性即善 (nature equals to goodness)” and “renxing ben shan
人性本善 (human nature is originally good)” (214, 215). However, these minor defects
do not hamper the essay in providing a concrete example of the enrichment of
Confucianism by ideas from external sources.
The author himself attempts to incorporate Western ideas through the two essays
on Hegel. The last essay of the book is an introduction to Hegel’s understanding of
“badness” and its positive contribution to self-transcendence and moral improvement.
The essay on the comparative study of Hegel and Xunzi uses Hegel’s thought to
further articulate Xunzi’s negative conception of human nature. The author suggests
that although Xunzi’s emphasis of the “Way of the King” (wangdao 王道) provides
important resources of moral criticism against the authoritarian rule, Xunzi’s negative
conception of human beings and his over-reliance on the ruler tend toward dictator-
ship and are contrary to the spirit of democracy. It is certainly debatable whether the
author gives a fair interpretation of Xunzi; nonetheless the author’s comments on
dictatorship and democracy show again his deep concern with the contemporary
relevance of Confucianism.
Lastly, there is an essay on the meaning of the term “keji” in the Analects. The
author dismisses the repressive aspect of the term and insists that it connotes a
positive image of the self being capable of practicing rituals. This position is
contentious but unsurprising as it accords with the central theme of the book, which
is to promote a positive image of Confucianism congenial to the contemporary
development of China. I shall leave the details of the textual analysis to the readers
to explore. The essay, just like the rest of the book, is sure to provide insightful
stimulation.
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